December 7th, 1941 was truly a day that would live in infamy in United States history. Not only was it one of the most devastating battles involving the US, but it was entirely lopsided, incurring overwhelming casualties among US military personnel. The attack on Pearl Harbor would become a benchmark for measuring acts of violence, terrorism, and unpreparedness for a fight between two opposing sides. In recent history, the terrorist attacks of September 11th are comparable in ways that illuminate a need for preparedness, yet a lack of action, intelligence, and ignoring the gut feeling of “bad things are coming” ruled the day. In the end, the reaction and response judge the US to the same standard as weathering the storm of a fight for survival.
Is a surprise attack ethical?
There are many different opinions on how wars are to be fought. Even in the most horrendous conflicts, at times there appears to be a code that honorable combatants follow. One such example falls under the laws of the Geneva Convention. Ranging on topics from the treatment of prisoners of war to the safeguarding of civilians, the Geneva Convention covers a vast number of issues that nations collectively established. But what of a surprise attack on an enemy?[1]

On the recent 80th anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor the question is posed; Was that devastating strike appropriate of one nation towards another with no declaration of war or open hostility? The argument could be made that the US and Japan were already in a volatile association over the US sanctioning of most importantly oil over Japan’s aggressive behavior, particularly with China. It could be argued that the path to war was inevitable with the posturing of both nations and that all that was needed to ignite that fiery powder keg of warfare was one action that neither nation could ignore any further. December 7th in 1941 was just that day, just that disastrous event.
Weighing the possibility of an intelligence failure

The topic of intelligence failure leading to the attack of Pearl Harbor is comparable to the intelligence failures of September 11th for overwhelmingly the same reason; it is not the lack of intelligence that was received and accumulated before each devastating attack, but the lack of action to act on intelligence and the willingness to share information with those on the frontlines and in the field. There was “chatter” before both attacks which would justify military and law enforcement to move more aggressively to prepare for violence.[2] One common piece of misinformation was that the Japanese fleet was in radio silence and therefore undetectable, yet when the Kidō Butai (Japan’s Mobile Strike Force carrier groups and battleships) set sail on November 26th from Tokyo Bay there was continued radio communication and the US knew this.[3] The US knew “something” was coming but just could not fathom a surprise attack of the magnitude that was launched.
A difficult position for a commander of forces is knowing an attack could happen at any time yet is unable to fill in the empty pieces of intelligence. Therefore, in times throughout history, such as December 7th and September 11th, inaction can prove to be more deadly than the wrong action. Man’s arrogance of knowledge and prestige interfere with the need for humility when faced with the unknown. The US had become quite skilled at intelligence gathering since the early years of signals and crypto intelligence. Unfortunately, as Secretary of State Henry Stimson stated in 1929, “Gentlemen do not read each other’s mail.”[4] Many felt this way than as some do in the present day. But, yet how many attacks can be avoided by just reading a bit of a suspicious gentleman’s mail?

Moving forward in a modern world
An important fact to realize and understand is that a surprise attack is rarely a complete surprise. The warning signs and the foreshadowing were present leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor. As history proved, the men and methods that were ignored before December 7th were relied on heavily following the attack. The recovery and response by the US intelligence community lead to the US trapping the Japanese task force at Midway, exacting retribution for the devastation of Pearl Harbor.
Intelligence gathering and dissemination can be tedious and chaotic. Successes are rarely given much due credit and failures are plastered over every news outlet and apparatus. Yet, the work and the sacrifices of the men and women who strive to prevent the next Pearl Harbor remain unsung heroes. We pray to never experience another Pearl Harbor, but the prayer remains that if some wish to harm Americans the struggle for information and protection will never be satisfied.
[1] “Geneva Conventions and Their Additional Protocols.” Legal Information Institute, Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/geneva_conventions_and_their_additional_protocols.
[2] Dahl, Erik J. “Why Won’t They Listen? Comparing Receptivity toward Intelligence at Pearl Harbor and Midway.” Intelligence and National Security, vol. 28, no. 1, 2013, pp. 68–70.
[3] Kahn, David. “The Intelligence Failure of Pearl Harbor.” Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, no. 5, 1991, pp. 144-146.
[4] Ibid, pp. 139.
Sources List:
Dahl, Erik J. “Why Won’t They Listen? Comparing Receptivity toward Intelligence at Pearl Harbor and Midway.” Intelligence and National Security, vol. 28, no. 1, 2013, pp. 68–90., https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.749061.
“Geneva Conventions and Their Additional Protocols.” Legal Information Institute, Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/geneva_conventions_and_their_additional_protocols.
Kahn, David. “The Intelligence Failure of Pearl Harbor.” Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, no. 5, 1991, pp. 138–152.